When Silence Goes to the Polls

Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin: When social dissent only becomes visible in the election results
A society without dissent does not achieve peace,
but loses the ability to recognize whether it is living in error.
Germany is a country where there is a lot of talk but surprisingly little dialogue. Debates take place, but they often remain confined to their own circles. The government speaks to the government, business to business, the media to the media, associations to associations – and all address the people, but rarely speak with the people, especially when they express views outside the prescribed narratives. Citizens listen, nod, shake their heads – and remain silent. Until election day. Then silence turns into a number.
43.8 percent for the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt. 38.2 percent for the AfD in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 25.7 percent for The Left in Berlin. Add to that the CDU’s plunge to 17.2 percent in Saxony-Anhalt, 4.9 percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and 18.8 percent in Berlin. The SPD holds steady at 35.5 percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania following a campaign heavily tailored to Manuela Schwesig, but drops to 12.1 percent in Berlin. These results do not represent a unified political movement. However, they do serve as a unified warning against the assumption that social stability can be measured by whether street protests remain manageable.
The people are not silent – they’re just speaking differently
The high voter turnout contradicts the simplistic narrative of the politically disengaged citizen. In Saxony-Anhalt, it rose to 77.8 percent; in Berlin, to 75.0 percent. These are not the numbers of a population that no longer wants to know anything. They are the numbers of a population that makes decisions. This is precisely where the significance of these elections lies: they make visible what often remains invisible in everyday life.
In The managed human, I developed the thesis that modern rule operates less through prohibitions than through management: through categorization, prioritization, repetition, and the tacit determination of what is considered reasonable. This does not necessarily lead to consent. It can just as easily lead to a state in which dissent is no longer articulated in conversation but instead finds an outlet in places where it cannot be moderated. The ballot box is one such place. It is secret, immediate, and free from the social sanctions of conversation.
This explains why public debate and election results can diverge. The peace movement remains weak, even though 57 percent of voters in Saxony-Anhalt supported ending arms deliveries to Ukraine. There are no large demonstrations against the massive increase in defense spending. Nevertheless, a party that explicitly and strongly rejects this very course is becoming the strongest political force. This does not prove a monocausal effect. But it shows that silence must not be confused with consent.
Social security and peace go hand in hand
Anyone who explains the elections solely in terms of migration is overlooking a crucial aspect. The exit poll in Saxony-Anhalt cites social security and peace in Europe as decisive issues. In Berlin, housing was the central state political issue, and Die Linke won there with a clear social platform. During the ARD “Elephant Round” debate, Ines Schwerdtner and Felix Banaszak highlighted the social burdens and societal divisions. In doing so, they touched on an issue that extends far beyond Berlin: People are not merely experiencing abstract reforms. They are experiencing prices, rents, pensions, job insecurity, and uncertainty about what will remain of their current way of life.
At the same time, the federal government is planning a restructuring of the welfare state. The Federal Ministry of Finance cites lower federal subsidies for pension insurance, the elimination of the supplementary adjustment in SGB II, and reforms to parental leave benefits and housing subsidies as part of the consolidation. The federal government argues that without such measures, growth, intergenerational justice, and long-term financial sustainability cannot be ensured. Critics speak of social cutbacks. These contrasting terms alone reveal what is at stake politically: not just money, but the question of who bears the burden of the restructuring.
The budget reveals the hierarchy of problems

2027 Federal Budget and 2026–2030 Financial Plan – Expenditures by Individual Programs. Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, government draft of July 6, 2026.
The budget is more than just a collection of numbers. It is a snapshot of political priorities. The regular defense budget rises from 82.7 billion euros in 2026 to 109.7 billion euros in 2027. The Bundeswehr Special Fund provides an additional 30 billion or so. Together, this amounts to just under 140 billion euros. Support for Ukraine will continue at 11.6 billion euros. At the same time, the NATO spending target is set to rise to 3.5 percent of gross domestic product by 2029. The federal government justifies this on the grounds of deterrence and the changed security situation in Europe. It is also noteworthy that the Federal Ministry of Finance explicitly points out that the increase in net borrowing is largely due to higher defense spending.
On the other hand, there are the areas that will determine the country’s civilian sustainability. The allocated funds for education/family and research/technology in the 2027 core budget are, combined, roughly one billion euros less than in 2026. The Special Infrastructure Fund will certainly provide an additional 1.4 billion euros in 2027 for education and childcare infrastructure, as well as 1.7 billion euros for research and development. This puts the decline into perspective, but does nothing to change the magnitude of the difference: the core budget and the Bundeswehr special fund together will grow by more than 30 billion euros in a single year, while the central knowledge and education sectors in the core budget are stagnating or declining.
The “Stay the Course” Speech
Friedrich Merz responded to election night with a speech notable for its logic. He acknowledged the CDU’s “disaster” in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, admitted to a lack of support from Berlin – and, above all, called for steadfastness. “The reforms must go ahead,” he said. Backbone, steadfastness, and patience are necessary, he added. The chancellor thus interprets the political crisis not as a mandate to reexamine the basic direction, but as a mandate to persevere with it more consistently.
This can be understood as leadership: governments must not abandon every long-term decision following a state election. But it can just as easily be read as a symptom of a political cycle in which criticism of the course is repeatedly translated into the need to explain that course more clearly. Wolfgang Kubicki said that this chancellor could no longer reach people with what he was saying. That same morning, Martin Huber called not for a change in course, but for the continuation of the reform agenda. The dpa described Merz as a chancellor who must push through the agreed-upon package despite resistance. The crucial question remains unanswered: Is the problem one of communication – or does the election result also reflect a rejection of parts of the program on its merits?
Eastern Germany as a Barometer
This question is particularly important for policy toward Russia and Ukraine. In Saxony-Anhalt, the connection is measurable: 57 percent of those surveyed welcomed the decision to refrain from further arms deliveries to Ukraine, and on the issue of peace, the AfD led in terms of perceived competence. For Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the historical and economic ties to Russia, the Nord Stream experience, and the growing skepticism over the years toward a confrontational policy toward Russia are significant factors.
That is precisely why the silence in the post-election debate is so interesting. The social burdens are being discussed, the chancellor’s communication style is being discussed, and migration is being discussed. In contrast, the massive financial and political restructuring toward higher defense spending often appears to be a given. As a result, the established parties arrive at a false assessment of the situation and limit their ability to make course corrections, while the public is left with the impression that they can debate the distribution of the burdens, but not the direction of the course itself. A democracy should not allow this to happen.
The economy won’t wait
For the issue of resources is becoming more acute. The Federal Ministry of Economics paints a mixed, overall subdued picture for September 2026: Large orders are propping up incoming orders, yet at the same time, industrial production fell by 2.2 percent in July compared to the previous month and by 3.3 percent compared to the previous year. The number of corporate bankruptcies remains high; in the 12-month period through June, there were 24,867 – 7.6 percent more than before. Employment and the labor market are showing signs of weakness. At the same time, the automotive industry, mechanical engineering, and energy-intensive sectors are facing international competitive pressure.
In The AI Pandemic, I described a second source of pressure: automation and artificial intelligence will transform employment, skill requirements, and business models faster than policymakers and the education system are prepared for. When, at the same time, the federal government’s interest burden rises and a growing portion of fiscal leeway is tied up in security and defense, competition for resources intensifies. In that case, the question of priorities is not a moral side issue, but a matter of economic survival.
A New Divide
The social divide therefore runs not only between the right and the left, urban and rural areas, and East and West. It also runs between those who prepare, legitimize, and oversee decisions, and those who bear the consequences of those decisions in their daily lives. The media, businesses, associations, labor unions, the cultural sector, and academia are by no means uniform; they argue internally and often contradict policymakers. Nevertheless, their institutional proximity to decision-making processes has given rise to a shared frame of reference that is increasingly distant from that of many citizens and resembles “tittytainment”: a great deal of discourse is visible, without this necessarily resulting in a genuine exchange with citizens and without any discernible real influence on the subjects under discussion.
Historian Philipp Blom argues that power has once again become something the elite distributes only among themselves. However, when power, information, and access circulate only within narrow circles relevant to decision-making, the danger of becoming detached from reality increases. And when Gabor Steingart says that capitalism has a big stomach, it must be noted: systems can digest contradictions for a long time without changing their underlying logic. The costs become apparent later – in distorted assessments of the situation, declining resilience, poorer decisions, and growing mistrust.
Instead of strengthening the center and weakening the peripheries,
the battle is fought over the center, and the fringes are strengthened.
What’s Missing After the Elections
The AfD and The Left are benefiting from the search for alternatives. They offer clear opposing positions on major individual issues: Russia and Ukraine, energy, migration, and tax policy for the AfD; housing, social security, wealth distribution, and rent for The Left. But that is not enough to serve as a concept for society as a whole. Germany does not need a new monologue from the right or the left. It needs a new narrative that brings together different interests and can be measured against reality.
As a working hypothesis, it can be assumed that such a narrative cannot avoid the need to think about reforms in a more complex way. Social reforms cannot be conceived without reforming military buildup plans – which means they must be scaled back. But that, in turn, can only be conceived if we become clear about the goals to which all action is subordinated. As Chinese President Xi Jinping stated at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2017, “The highest criterion for all the Party’s work can only be the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people.” We must adhere to the principle of treating what may seem like trivial matters to the people as our own major concerns, and address the issues that are close to the people’s hearts – whose resolution will satisfy them – in order to guide the people in creating a beautiful life at all times!” – then one must ask: What narrative exists regarding German politics? China’s emergence as an existential competitor to Germany should be reason enough to examine the systemic causes of how this came to be and what Germany can learn from China at the systemic level.
If one wishes to pursue reforms in this direction, these four prerequisites appear fundamental: respect for everyone and everything; a willingness to engage in debate – especially with what one rejects; an absolute commitment to the truth, which also includes one’s own errors; and #modernThinking – that is, the ability to productively combine complexity, technological development, civilizational progress, and cognitive diversity. This is not a party platform. It is a method by which a country can strengthen its foundations.
Elections will be held in Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Bremen in April and May 2027. They will not be a repeat of the East German elections – the political cultures and issues at stake are different. But they will show just how widespread the alienation from the current political offerings has become. As Jürgen Habermas puts it,
The ‘yes’ needs the ‘no’ in order to prevail against the ‘no,’
it cannot be ruled out that voters in the West, too, will recognize the election as an exercise that isn’t all that difficult – and interpret it in the spirit of Bruce Lee. The decisive factor will be whether, by then, “perseverance” has given way to debate – or whether the conversation will continue to focus primarily on how to better explain a predetermined course of action to the people.
Democracy needs not only the voice of the people,
but also their eyes, their ears, and their minds.








