Constitutional Crisis in Saxony-Anhalt (Part 1)

How Parliamentary Oversight Becomes Institutional Self-Affirmation: And on a Criminal-Law Review of Petition Work

Elected representatives are supposed to represent the citizen vis-à-vis the state.

If they represent the state vis-à-vis the citizen,

parliamentary oversight becomes institutional self-affirmation.

Democracy rarely fails because of a single major event. It erodes more quietly. It does not begin only when political smear campaigns are used to conceal one’s own comprehensive failure political defamation is used to mask one’s own comprehensive failure, when parliaments are openly stripped of their power, or when courts visibly capitulate to politics. It begins earlier: when small shifts become the norm, when jurisdictional boundaries take precedence over accountability competences become more important than responsibility, when the order of files replaces the order of truth when the ordering of files replaces the ordering of truth, when morality becomes a variable of usefulness. Even a democratically sound form can become a shell of arbitrariness if it no longer sustains its substance.

It loses its substance even where its forms remain intact, but its meaning is lost. Where petitions are accepted, files are maintained, meetings are held, and decisions are made – but the actual actual subject matter of the citizen’s concern is no longer genuinely addressed. Where institutions no longer ask: What is true? What is legally and politically justifiable? But rather: How can this matter be categorized so that it no longer bothers us?

For nearly twelve years now, I have been suing the Magdeburg Tax Office for fraud, coercion, and violation of public morality fraud, coercion, and conduct contrary to good morals – documented in thousands of pages of briefs I have drafted myself thousands of pages of written pleadings I have drafted myself. It played a part in ensuring that an investment of over four million euros in the MIRAKEL reading machine was squandered. It played its part in ensuring that an investment of more than four million euros in the MIRAKEL reading machine was destroyed. From this long-running dispute, I can report how decisions were made in various courts – under the guise of judicial authority under the claim of judicial authority – that ignored the Basic Law, the law, and the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. I can report on delays, on the devaluation of the right to a fair hearing the devaluation of the right to be heard, on procedural maneuvers that circumvent substantive law, and on a closed institutional circle of legitimacy in which errors are not corrected but rather mutually reinforced. The more extensively I analyzed these actions, the more one might have expected that specific legal errors on my part would be demonstrated. In fact, however, my arguments were met primarily with delays, non-engagement, and formal dismissal.

Among the most striking examples are my experiences with Judges Burckgard and Leifermann at the Saxony-Anhalt Finance Court Judges Burckgard and Leifermann at the Fiscal Court of Saxony-Anhalt. Certain incidents, as well as the proceedings as a whole, gave me the impression of psychological torture the impression of white torture. Added to this was the fact that, in a complaint that required the involvement of the Federal Finance Court and, for that purpose, an application for legal aid, the relevant attachments were simply removed. This and other incidents led to two criminal complaints being filed against Judge Burckgard with the Dessau-Roßlau Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Be vigilant: First political action, the media,

and the judiciary erode the social substance value, already damaged by narrow-mindedness,

and is followed by law as the norm

of the new order of a “Zeitenwende”.

An integral part of our democracy’s self-conception democracy’s self-understanding is the principle of the separation of powers. This principle is enshrined, at least, in the Basic Law anchored, at least, in the Basic Law, specifically in Article 20, paragraph 2, sentence 2. This provision stipulates that state authority is exercised by distinct branches: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Furthermore, the strict adherence of these branches to law and order binding of these powers to law and justice is enshrined in Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law. This structure is protected by the eternity clause in Article 79, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law.

My experiences attest to a different reality. Where allegations of serious violations of the law, perversion of justice, or manipulation of the procedural foundations are raised, the response from the Dessau-Roßlau Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Naumburg Office of the Attorney General Public Prosecutor General’s Office in Naumburg, and the Saxony-Anhalt Ministry of Justice must not consist of a formulaic refusal to take up the matter. Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law requires adherence to law and justice – it does not require the protection of one’s own institution sparing one’s own institution. This is precisely where the practical significance of our constitutional architecture becomes evident. These bodies should not have functioned as mutually legitimizing stages in the transfer of case files, but rather as stages of rule-of-law self-correction.

Yet the opposite occurred. The public prosecutor’s office evaded a substantive investigation, the Office of the State Prosecutor legitimized this failure to investigate the Public Prosecutor General’s Office legitimized this failure to investigate, and the Ministry of Justice treated the objections raised against this not as a matter of political and administrative accountability, but as a matter that should, if possible, remain within the existing system. Thus, the separation of powers became not mutual limitation, but a chain of mutual exoneration. This, however, contradicts the self-understanding of our democracy described above: State power is not divided among different branches so that each branch leaves the other’s mistakes unchallenged. It is divided so that power remains subject to control. But when the public prosecutor’s office, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Ministry of Justice effectively prop each other up instead of measuring the facts presented against the law, the separation of powers is practically turned on its head.

A similar problem arose in the petition process. The petition offered the state legislature the opportunity to politically scrutinize the conduct of the executive branch, the public prosecutor’s offices, and the Ministry of Justice. It did not demand the reversal of court decisions, but rather an examination of state responsibility. The Petitions Committee should therefore have first clarified what the petition was actually about. It is precisely this clarification that was not carried out in a sound manner.

Instead, the issue was shifted in a legally more convenient direction: toward an alleged encroachment on judicial independence. My corrections, my references to the executive nature of the issue, and my motion to involve the Legal Affairs Committee should have visibly shaped the committee’s work. However, they were simply ignored. As a result, not only was my concern overlooked, but the State Parliament was ultimately presented with a basis for decision-making that no longer reflected the true subject matter of the petition.

When the recommended resolution to reject my petition recommended decision to reject my petition was finally presented to me, the substantial distortion of the petition’s core became clear in two respects: First, despite repeated corrections, it was still claimed that I was demanding an encroachment on judicial independence, even though my petition targeted executive, prosecutorial, ministerial, and political responsibility was directed at executive, prosecutorial, ministerial, and political responsibility. Second, a ChatGPT communication submitted on September 4, 2025, during the committee meeting was treated as a letter from me containing my own demands, even though this document contained neither a recipient nor a sender, a date, nor a signature, and merely documented an analysis of possible legislative courses of action documented an analysis of legislative options for action. The declaration of undertaking I demanded – which would have required the Petitions Committee to correct these two misrepresentations to me and the state legislature – went unanswered.

The situation escalated with the involvement of the State Parliament’s President. The matter became more serious with the involvement of the President of the State Parliament. When the President is informed that a recommended resolution misrepresents the subject matter of a petition, this affects not only administrative procedure but also the dignity and functionality of the parliament. For the State Parliament can only make responsible decisions if the basis presented to it is truthful true to the facts. If, nevertheless, the substitute version is retained until the state parliament’s decision, a fundamental political question arises: Did the parliament actually exercise oversight – or did it merely rubber-stamp the institutional dismissal of an inconvenient citizen’s petition?

The handling of the petition, as well as the overall process of my lawsuit – which has been pending since 2014 – attest to an internal breakdown of the constitutional order internal loss of function of the constitutional order in Saxony-Anhalt. That is why I speak of a constitutional crisis in Saxony-Anhalt. I do not mean the external collapse of the system, but rather its internal loss of substance: Where the parliament, the committee, and the president no longer ensure that the state legislature decides on the actual matter at hand; where the executive branch, through its agencies, does not examine allegations relevant to criminal and supervisory law regarding judicial actions in light of the law regarding judicial conduct against the law, but instead dismisses them without consequence through non-referral and mutual legitimization non-engagement and mutual legitimization; and where the judiciary itself no longer reliably uses the Basic Law and the law as the standard for its actions, the constitutional form becomes a shell for a practice that no longer operates in accordance with the constitution. Institutions retain their constitutional function but act contrary to its spirit. Oversight becomes a shield, procedures become a means of avoiding the truth, and representation becomes self-affirmation.

As a consequence of the decision by the State Parliament of Saxony-Anhalt – of which I only became aware a few days ago – which in fact rejected my petition, I have this week initiated a criminal-law review by the Magdeburg Public Prosecutor’s Office of the actions of the Petitions Committee and the President of the State Parliament. The way similar allegations have been handled in the past gives reason to believe that this investigation, too, will not be conducted seriously but will be steered into a dead end with prepared responses. All the more reason, then, for this article to publicly counter actions that undermine our democracy: The brief requesting the criminal investigation and its attachments can be found here and here. In what follows, I will address the political dimension of this case.

What I am describing may initially sound like an isolated case. But it is more than that. The case shows how parliamentary oversight can quickly turn into institutional self-affirmation. It shows how a citizen’s concern is transformed into a more convenient substitute. And it shows how dangerous it is when important constitutional principles – in this case, judicial independence – are used as a shield to push entirely different responsibilities out of sight.

The Illusory World of Orderly Procedures

Democracy does not thrive solely on institutions. It thrives on the integrity of its institutions the truthfulness of its institutions. A procedure is not democratic simply because it is carried out formally correct. A committee does not exercise oversight simply because it meets. A parliament is not an expression of the will of the people simply because it votes.

What matters is whether reality finds its way into the process. When a citizen raises a concern, that concern must be grasped in its actual substance. It may be rejected. It may be deemed unfounded. It may fail to convince politically. But it must not be reshaped simply because that other form is easier to deal with.

That is exactly what happened here: My petition was not treated as what it essentially was – a demand for political oversight of executive, prosecutorial, and ministerial actions. Instead, it was reinterpreted as a fiction that the Petitions Committee could more easily reject by invoking judicial independence. My repeated attempts to set the record straight – in particular, my clarification that I was not calling for the legislature to overturn judicial decisions – were not incorporated into a new basis for decision-making that was true to the facts. This led me to state the following in a letter to the President of the State Parliament of Saxony-Anhalt:

The Petitions Committee of the State Parliament of Saxony-Anhalt intends to lie to the members of the State Parliament of Saxony-Anhalt.

In the end, the State Parliament adopted a decision on a recommendation that addressed not my actual concern, but rather its institutionally generated substitute version.

Outwardly, everything remained intact: case number, statement, recommended resolution, state parliament resolution. Internally, however, the subject matter had shifted. I spoke of executive responsibility: the Petitions Committee evaded this by accusing me of demanding interference with judicial independence. I called for parliamentary oversight: the Petitions Committee acts as if I were demanding that it issue a judicial ruling. I demanded a correction – the Petitions Committee ignored it. Politically speaking, the result is therefore not merely an error, but an accusation of deception: The state legislature was presented with an account that no longer reflected the true subject matter of my petition.

 This creates a democratic semblance: The people are allowed to speak, but their words are not taken to mean what they actually mean. They are heard without being understood. Their concerns are addressed without ever truly being addressed.

Judicial Independence as a Valid Principle and a False Evasive Maneuver

Judicial independence is at the core of our constitutional state state under the rule of law. It protects courts from political influence. It is indispensable. Precisely for this reason, it must not be abused. I have touched upon on several occasions I have touched on several times the fact that, in line with our societal condition, it has led to undesirable developments – and my various cases serve as examples of this – and that these developments cry out for reform; however, I will not delve further into this here.

A constitutional principle is devalued when it becomes a mere evasion tactic an evasive formula. Those who invoke judicial independence to protect court decisions from political alteration from political modification are acting in accordance with the rule of law. However, those who use it to strip Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law and Section 339 of the Criminal Code of their meaning – and to shield the conduct of public prosecutors, ministries, or administrative bodies public-prosecutorial, ministerial, or administrative conduct from parliamentary oversight – are distorting the meaning of the principle. Judicial independence is then no longer understood as a limit on political influence, but as a smokescreen in front of executive responsibility. This is dangerous, because in a state governed by the rule of law, no area of state action may be made immune through misclassification.

This is not about a parliament overturning court rulings. It must not do so. It is about a parliament being able – and indeed required – to examine whether authorities, ministries, and public prosecutors’ offices are fulfilling their responsibilities. Anyone who prevents this scrutiny by pulling everything under the umbrella of judicial independence is not protecting the law. They are protecting institutions from the law.

It was no accident that the framers of the Basic Law placed Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law at the inviolable core of the constitutional order. The binding of judicial decisions to law and legal principles The binding of the judiciary to statute and law is not a mere ornamental constitutional provision, but the intrinsic standard the inner standard for every judicial decision. Perverting the course of justice under Section 339 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) is narrowly defined under criminal law and difficult to enforce in practice – certainly also because matters relevant under criminal law fall victim to the principle of mutual legitimation matters relevant under criminal law fall victim to mutual legitimation. But the very existence of this provision shows that judicial independence does not mean freedom from the law. It protects decision-making within the law – it does not protect a deliberate breach of the law.

My criminal complaints against Judge Burckgard target precisely this line aim precisely at this boundary. They do not merely allege that a court ruled incorrectly. They describe instances in which procedural foundations were manipulated, documents relevant to the decision were invalidated or removed, and constitutional standards were not only overlooked but effectively practically suspended. Whether this constitutes perversion of justice under criminal law is a matter for a serious investigation. Politically, however, this much is already clear: If such allegations are merely formally dismissed by prosecutors’ offices and subsequently treated as settled by other institutions, Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law becomes a mere facade.

That is why the blanket invocation blanket retreat to of judicial independence is so dangerous. It confuses independence with unaccountability. A judge must not be instructed by politicians, but state organs must not act as if any indication of potentially unlawful conduct by judges or prosecutors is off-limits simply because a court was involved somewhere. Anyone who takes Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law seriously must keep the line between judicial freedom and responsibility under the rule of law open.

Disregard for Citizens as a Warning Sign for Democracy

In a democracy, citizens are not supplicants before the institutions, but the bearers of popular sovereignty. At least, that is the theory. According to this theory, a petition is therefore not a burdensome administrative procedure. It is an encounter between the people and the state. The citizen says: “I see a problem here.” Parliament does not have to agree, but it must take the issue seriously. It must accurately grasp the subject matter. It must examine it; it must not evade it. It must be able to debate with the citizen without reinterpreting the citizen’s position.

However, if a petition is handled in such a way that its actual concern is transformed into a more convenient substitute version, it is not just the individual petitioner who is disregarded. The democratic relationship itself is damaged. For in doing so, the state is effectively telling the citizen: We accept your words, but we reserve the right to give them a different meaning. This is a profound form of degradation. It is not loud. It requires no insults. It occurs through procedures. But that is precisely why it is so effective.

Mutual Indulgence Instead of Mutual Control

The liberal state is built on checks and balances. Parliament, the government, the administration, the judiciary, and the public are not meant to trust one another blindly, but to limit one another. Not out of mistrust of the state, but out of respect for freedom. When this system functions, parliament checks the executive branch. Ministries must explain themselves. The actions of the public prosecutor’s office can be questioned politically without violating judicial independence. Administrative action does not become unassailable simply because they are closely tied to judicial proceedings.

When this system no longer functions, a different pattern emerges: institutions legitimize one another. The state government makes a statement. The committee takes over. The state legislature wraps it up. The state government explains. The committee adopts. The State Parliament disposes of the matter. The president does not intervene. The public prosecutor’s office does not investigate with the necessary depth – or, more precisely, not at all. And all institutions subsequently confronted with this inaction invoke precisely this inaction. Left behind is the citizen, who can do little to counter this institutional defensive block – not least because many bodies that claim to represent citizens are similarly trapped.

The danger to democracy lies not only in a single wrong decision. It lies in becoming accustomed to such processes. In the normalization of institutional self-preservation. In the notion that procedures are lawful and democratic simply because they are carried out formally correctly. Thus, democracy becomes a fiction, and oversight becomes general confirmation.

Why Transparency Is Necessary

I am making the criminal investigation – as well as the entire process – public because I do not want it to disappear into the darkness of the files disappear into the dark of the files. This is not a staging of personal affectedness. It is a contribution to democratic transparency.

If institutions do not take care of the people, the people will take care of things themselves.

The course of events so far gives rise to concerns that the public prosecutor’s office will once again shy away from a substantive examination of the matter. Political considerations are likely at play here – especially in light of the upcoming state election. In some respects, our political system is showing a dangerous erosion of its ability to self-correct: It is deemed preferable to accept that such actions erode our constitutional order rather than to substantively address failures and thereby demonstrate – or rather, allow hope to grow once more – that elected representatives truly represent the people and prove themselves worthy of their mandate and their position.

Therefore, transparency is not a means of exerting pressure, but a prerequisite for democratic health democratic hygiene, and it is not an attack on democracy, but an effort to serve it. When institutions go easy on one another spare one another and place themselves above the people, the people must not accept this for their own sake for its own sake. The Basic Law supports them in this, and Article 20, Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law stands as the ultimate constitutional safeguard constitutional reserve when all other means fail. Quite obviously, this provision must be remembered.

The power of good does not unfold

through the means of evil.

When institutions undermine the constitutional order and prove incapable of safeguarding it through their actions; when they prioritize procedures over the truth; when they use legal language to evade accountability; and when they believe they can deprive citizens of their constitutional rights – a duty arises to oppose this. Resistance does not mean violence. In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, it is based on respect for everyone and everything, on critical engagement, and on truth. This is the essential prerequisite for transparency, and transparency is the prerequisite for change.

I have already invested a great deal of effort in acting transparently and bringing about change: I will report on this in due course. The petition itself is an expression of this effort, for it gave the legislature in Saxony-Anhalt the opportunity to demonstrate that the members of the Saxony-Anhalt State Parliament are contributing to the preservation of the constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. My efforts led me to the conclusion that they failed to do so.

This text, therefore, is not intended to express outrage This text is therefore not intended to express outrage: outrage is not a political concept. I write because I serve my state and its people serve my country and its people – with analysis, with experience, with concepts, and with a willingness to look where institutions would rather not look at themselves. A democracy that merely manages criticism loses its ability to learn. A state under the rule of law that protects itself from its own examination loses its law. A parliament that no longer represents citizens vis-à-vis the state, but rather the state vis-à-vis citizens, becomes a mere facade of itself.

Saxony-Anhalt deserves better. Our state deserves institutions that are strong enough to be held accountable to the law. People deserve a state that does not reinterpret them, but takes them seriously. Democracy deserves elected representatives who protect not the calm of the system, but the truth of the polity.

Do we continue as before, or do we reflect. In this respect, attention is understandably focused on the election on September 6, 2026. But who should one vote for? Who – and which party – actually gives the people a clear and verifiable reason to hope that they will be worthily represented and that their benefit is the measure of all action? I freely admit – and I can also state here that I have gone to great lengths to clarify precisely this point – that I see no one. In this regard, the question for all parties is: Do we continue as before, or do we reflect and work together with the people, for the people, and for our country to overcome the challenges of our time?

Something must change – one way or another. Something must change – one way or another. Something must change – one way or another. What is the moral of this? Something must change – one way or another. No outcome of the state election will lead to any substantially new insights substantively new experience if the people do not understand that they must not tolerate the arrogance of those they have elected – and that they have a right not to have to tolerate it. The people must realize It must be clear to the people: They must not give away their voice on September 6. It is needed beyond election day. Silence is not a choice.

I have long strived to lead by example and to lay a foundation from which what is valuable and substantial can be achieved. In this instance, I will not let up until the law’s own right to become effective is enforced. Supporting this effort, too, can be a contribution to strengthening one’s own self-determination. The value of values unfolds only in concrete terms.

Self-determination does not arise from an abstract belief in democracy. It arises where people no longer accept specific injustices concrete impositions as the norm: a falsified petition, an unverified criminal complaint a criminal complaint that has not been examined, a committee that evades responsibility, a parliament that dismisses matters without truly examining them, a state parliament president who protects the dignity of parliament only formally. Those who speak out against such practices are not merely defending themselves. They are practicing and protecting democracy.

This leads to a recommendation: Citizens must not only cast their votes on Election Day, but also remain engaged between elections retain their voice between elections. They must document, ask questions, publish, challenge, network, and remind their representatives of their mandate. Political parties must offer more than just platforms; they must develop procedures through which accountability is verifiably assumed. Parliaments must understand that citizen oversight citizen corrections is not a disturbance, but rather a test of democracy. The media must not only report on conflicts but also get to the truth of the underlying events. And the judiciary must understand that trust does not grow through isolation but through verifiable adherence to the law.

This specific case is just one example of this. Its value lies in the fact that it illustrates just how wide the gap between democratic ideals and institutional reality has become. This gap is not closed by outrage, but through persistent, transparent, and documented scrutiny persistent, traceable, documented engagement. Only in this way can criticism become a contribution to the polity.

The increasing self-determination of each of us

contributes to our country in much the same way as the drop of water

that gives the river its power.

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