Déjà vu – The right to protection against digital violence
- Bernd Liske
- 2 days ago
- 11 min read
Be vigilant: First, the small-minded person undermines the already damaged social substance value through their political actions, the media, and the judiciary – followed by a law as the norm of the new order of a "turning point.
Take a look at this, I thought to myself when I read about the intention to introduce a law against digital violence: this seems familiar. As much as I am impressed by the inner harmony of German law, I am always surprised at how little the judiciary strives to bring it to bear. I have the impression that recent efforts to shape the law are based on rather short-sighted and self-serving considerations.
In June 2013, I was asked by the BITKOM defense working group to comment on a joint statement by the BDI and BITKOM on the planned EU directive on ensuring a high common level of network and information security (NIS). According to the directive, member states should be required to establish a minimum level of national capabilities by setting up authorities responsible for NIS, forming IT emergency response teams, and developing national NIS strategies and national NIS cooperation plans. Secondly, a platform should be created to facilitate the exchange of information on threats and incidents. And thirdly, the proposal should develop a "culture of risk management" and oblige companies to take measures to ensure NIS and report security incidents.
The discussion took place a few days after Edward Snowden lifted the veil of supposed security and gave us a glimpse of the reality. One might have assumed that such perceptions would somehow influence the discussion at Germany's largest IT association, but this was not the case. The association made a sincere effort to suggest a debate of some kind without having to grapple with the actual facts. It can be illustrated as follows:
In the aftermath of a flood, it is discovered that a number of houses have mold in their basements. Instead of dealing with how to get the mold out, the floors above are comfortably furnished, the residents are required to report immediately if the mold spreads to the rooms, and it is determined that they must then take care of the mold in their rooms themselves . Statistics are centrally managed to show which houses have rooms with mold. The basements are not taken into consideration.
Strange types like me—in Divergent, I would probably count myself among the undetermined—can't deal with such repression, so I initially opposed the idea of shifting responsibility to companies (email dated June 21, 2013).
If I interpret it correctly, your paper is based on the fundamental assumption that the market will ensure security and, in cases where this is not successful, cyber teams will deal with the situation. This approach leaves room for speculation that experiences will be gained that run counter to German and European interests.
In this respect, the issue must be understood as a national or pan-European task in a similar way to how it already exists in the conventional military environment, with entrepreneurial expertise taking care of the implementation of the objectives set. The protection of external borders then also limits the effort required within the borders, e.g., for smaller companies.
Cyber teams with their – quite different – tasks are integrated into or established within the classic authority structure and thus also subject to its self-image: police, BKA, constitutional protection. This does not replace what I perceive as issues in the CERT environment, but rather involves issues of perception and combating activities that are contrary to security.
This ultimately led to a creative burst of inspiration that took me, via an intermediate step, to the widespread intellectual construct of redesigning the networks, which I spent the following weeks discussing with everyone in Germany who was in any way involved with the topic of security. The response was so overwhelming that my aphorisms on silence in particular gained traction, I wrote the manuscript for my first book, PRISM – Ein Lehrstück für unsere Demokratie (PRISM – A Lesson for Our Democracy), within three weeks in August, and was ultimately expelled from BITKOM because they couldn't bear to see a small fry like me expose how the entire German IT elite was ducking away in an association already dominated by American companies.
Let us turn to an excerpt from the book
Security is not primarily a money-making business in which strategies are developed to ensure security by taking isolated interests into account. Rather, holistic strategies should ensure security in line with the vision and values of a society, even if the necessary measures may cost money.
A technical infrastructure must not be allowed to develop further and further, or create a constructed super-fundamental right to security, but rather, in line with the vision and values of a society, create a technical infrastructure that meets the standards. If this results in the realization of the super fundamental right of a nation's citizens to be assured of the protection of their fundamental rights, then this is what must be implemented. This cannot be delegated as a responsibility to companies. As is the case with other tasks—e.g., the right to use force—the state does not place these tasks under the responsibility of its citizens.
, the present draft. There is no doubt that it is necessary to address the problem of insults, defamation, and threats on the internet. As much as the ability to obtain comprehensive information and exchange ideas online is one of the beneficial aspects of the internet, it has also become an outlet for forms of expression that are generally frowned upon in the real world—although, upon deeper reflection, one could also argue that this is simply a continuation of what often takes place in secret or in certain circles. The ability to hide one's identity—often used out of a legitimate desire to protect oneself from the zeitgeist—creates a framework for those who want to live out their dark power , and then anonymity becomes the basis for cowardice, for not wanting to take responsibility for the filth one spews. If this is not stopped, people get used to it and create a new normality through consistency and insufficient response. If providers then support this through their rankings, a culture develops that spreads from the internet into the real world.
Since I started using TWITTER at the end of 2019, I have encountered many haters and rarely found that my efforts to show them respect by addressing their hostility led them to reconsider. I deviate too much from a social norm that either silently accepts hateful comments or even appreciates them – as evidenced by the often considerable number of followers. I now routinely screen the profiles of commentators, even those whose tweets are not immediately suspicious, for words such as "asshole," "idiot," "fuck**," "stupid," "Putin troll," and often find what I'm looking for. Several attempts to report tweets containing threats to TWITTER and to the police have been unsuccessful.
The power of effortlessness: Too many prohibitions in the world, and people become incompetent; too many sharp weapons among the people, and confusion increases among the people; too much sophistication among the people, and more and more strange things happen; too much growth in laws and regulations, and too many criminals appear.
Lao-tzu (6th century BC), Chinese philosopher, from the Tao-te-king
But do we need a new law for this? Isn't it enough to use the existing instruments, to remind those in positions of responsibility of their obligations, but above all to sensitize society not to simply accept such things? I think that this discussion must be held before we adorn ourselves with a new law whose weapons remain blunt against the stated goals, but hit completely different ones with precision.
Looking at the intentions so far, the first thing that strikes us is the statement that "in a community based on individual freedom," "the enforcement of law is never solely a matter for public prosecutors, administrative authorities, and private companies (so-called gatekeepers)" and "those affected must always have the power to take effective action themselves against the violation of their rights." There can certainly be no objection to the word "effectively," but the word "themselves" means, as in the NSA affair, that those affected must "themselves" take care of obtaining their rights—which seems questionable and "ineffective" given that they already finance a state that could actually take care of this. Even more questionable is the decision to have complaints handled by the regional courts. Regardless of the fact that these courts are not known to be underworked or particularly "efficient," this would incur legal fees, if not court costs, so that the use of these options would likely be limited to a small circle of affected parties and state structures. The swords listed under "II Measures" are thus rendered blunt from the outset.
In a democracy, intentions are pursued quietly.
But there is another area that the planned draft law does not address, but which certainly falls under the category of digital violence: censorship – I count myself among those affected. Without going into a full description here, this is particularly evident in the fact that I have the dubious honor of having all my tweets on TWITTER not only published for a long time under the category "Show more replies, especially those that may contain offensive content," but also placed at the bottom of the list – regardless of when they were published. Another of my experiences with as a last resort is that some of my dangerous aphorisms are simply not accessible via search – such as those on lateral thinking (while the other aphorisms on lateral thinking can be found), feelings, and the elites. When you then realize that those who attack you with hate tweets are ranked at the top and thus have a completely different perception, you start to wonder and ask yourself what the whole event is supposed to achieve. The fact that I have published the most important 1,300 threads and tweets from my first year on Twitter, together with over 2,300 references, in a book entitled Liske twittert – Blickwinkel eines Querdenkers (Liske tweets – Perspectives of a lateral thinker) speaks to my conviction that such a ranking of my texts is unjustified and that I am confident in their quality and can subject them to any scrutiny.
For years, I have been trying in vain to take action against this treatment of me. TWITTER protects itself against discussion of its failures with a message page that is difficult to use, allows only multiple-choice questions and no problem descriptions, and excludes certain topics. There is never a concrete response – especially not with information that would allow me to reflect on a possible failure. TWITTER acts as a special court in a similar way to the times of heresy or other dark ages, when the verdict was predetermined, the reasoning arbitrary, and an appeal impossible. The Federal Office of Justice, data protection authorities, and the police, who were called in, seemed to be busy compiling statistics, sending letters about lack of jurisdiction from their template database, or doing nothing at all. Even before I knew about the draft law, I sent a letter to Federal Minister of Justice Marco Buschmann on March 30—a similar letter was sent to Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser because of the dangers to the free democratic basic order: I was quite sure from the outset how this would be dealt with. The letter states that I consider the practice described to be a violation of the Basic Law and the NetzDG.
I suspect that I am not alone in my experiences, and I suspect even more. If the executive, legislative, and judicial branches do not want to expose themselves to accusations of acting contrary to the Basic Law, they will have no choice but to create a regulatory framework for these circumstances as well.
What would I do? Systemically, I come to similar conclusions as in the NSA affair. Effective protection of the population and businesses is only possible if it is derived from the state's monopoly on the use of force and does not have to be created individually. I would do without decentralized police structures and, to a large extent, without courts, but would instead want to create a self-regulating system – one that can be optimized again and again in light of new findings.
Principle. The customer is king, as the saying goes, and in this respect, a process chain that complies with the constitution must be created to guarantee citizens' right to express themselves freely and safely. Providers whose business model includes enabling citizens to do so must provide an easily accessible, easy-to-use, and comprehensive complaint management system that guarantees their users a concrete description of their concerns and prompt processing. The same applies to the state and the structures it commissions. In principle, this also means that those affected can usually manage without lawyers because their rights are sufficiently protected and represented by the providers and the state.
Organization. A central office for complaints will be created online—perhaps several, depending on state sovereignty or specific problem requirements—whose task is to protect and represent the interests of citizens and pursue their interests in the event of intervention. Based on its authority, it is entitled to decide on complaints, demand measures from providers, and impose administrative fines if necessary, even in individual cases. Decisions can be appealed to a panel of independent ombudsmen (I include women here). All decisions are recorded in a publicly accessible register with the complete data set – which may only be anonymized at the request of the person in need of protection with regard to personal data. Mistakes within the structures can also be made public. The aim of this is not least to have an impact on the social culture in dealing with one another and the effectiveness of the structures – but also to ensure that measures are limited solely to the proclaimed punishable purpose and that anonymity can only be lifted in that case.
If, from the perspective of those seeking protection, this public process does not adequately address the problem, they are free to take legal action.
Acceleration. The media, complaints office, and ombudsmen are coordinated with each other and must respond within a specified period of time. The number of staff is determined by the effort required for this.
Quality – using the example of the TWITTER category "Show more replies, including those that may contain offensive content." Tweets from providers who use a specific – transparently visible – vocabulary or who have attracted attention due to other transparent rules are classified there. The same rights and transparency rules apply as for complaints – not least to prevent arbitrariness.
Special situations.
Calls for or threats of violence, as well as threats to public safety, must be promptly reported to the public prosecutor's office and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and must also be dealt with substantially and promptly by these authorities.
In the case of defamatory and yet-to-be-determined offenses, there is a right to disclosure of identity so that those affected can take legal action in addition to publication in the register. In order to relieve the burden on the courts, the central office can impose fines, which also benefit those affected.
Repeat offenders. Providers know the identity of users with anonymous accounts. Anyone who violates the basic rules after repeated warnings will be banned. The same rights and transparency rules apply as for complaints – not least to prevent arbitrariness.
Revision. The entirety of the organization, rules, and measures will initially be put up for public discussion annually, and later every two years. Within the following quarter, measures for optimization in line with real life may be derived from this.
The state is sufficiently qualified and responsible to protect the diverse interests of its citizens and businesses without having to impose additional responsibilities on them. This must also be remembered in the present case. The reengineering of problem-solving processes is an essential contribution to administrative efficiency and the relief of administrative structures.
Citizens, in turn, must realize that as sovereigns they have both responsibilities and opportunities—towards their fellow citizens and the state. We are a people who only have a future together. Only together can the free democratic basic order and the intrinsic value of democracy be strengthened.
