Anti-Semitism – a question of semantics

A plan to curb it and end the war in the Middle East

Like a stone thrown in a direction away from the path, thoughts sometimes come to me and I take the liberty of letting them escape without delving deeper into them. This is linked to the knowledge that it arises from a solid foundation of values, tools, analyses, and concepts, and the experience that when I am called upon to prove its substance, I find my way to it.

On November 16, I wrote explicitly on X for the first time and then several times in variations:

You are confusing anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism.

I had already argued along these lines several times before – for example, on November 10 to the editor-in-chief of the Neue Züricher Zeitung, Eric Gujer:

Good evening, Mr. Gujer. I'm going to venture a line of reasoning that arises solely from this tweet with this quote.

The perspective seems wrong to me, Mr. Gujer: it equates anti-Semitism with an attitude toward Israel, asserts a fundamental attitude toward Israel, and obscures the view of concrete aspects. The treatment of the Palestinians is likely to be of primary importance, and the view of it has nothing to do with anti-Semitism.

In this respect, such a perspective also opens up the development of a different attitude toward Israel, and anti-Semitism can be significantly reduced with such a perspective alone—so it seems to me, and I venture to say this without having dealt with it in great detail—because an affirmative answer to the question of whether one is against Jews is followed by the question: Why? My thesis: The overwhelming reaction will relate to Israel and not to Jews in general, and there primarily to the treatment of the Palestinians.

Is this idea tenable?

No opinion was expressed. In response to a post on December 17,

I consider it a major problem that people talk and write about anti-Semitism instead of anti-Zionism: Similar to the AfD, this promotes what is being problematized.

Sigmount Königsberg, the anti-Semitism commissioner of the Jewish community in Berlin, responded.

The modern anti-Semite does not say, "I hate Jews," but "I hate Zionists!" However, it is Jews who are meant and affected. Therefore, anti-Zionism (which denies the Jewish people's right to self-determination) is the current expression of hatred toward Jews.

I did not respond to the implicit accusation that I was a "modern anti-Semite": I was interested in the substance of the overall thesis. However, I had never dealt with the subject before, even though it can make an important contribution to the primary focus of my analysis – the constitution of German society. But now I was challenged and responded within a few minutes.

I thank you for forcing me to think about my thesis. Certainly, "I would like it to be simple. Yes, that would be nice. But the time for that is over. It will not come again." I think:

A) The number of people who can be said to hate Jews is likely to be much smaller if we remove from the total those who can be considered anti-Zionists. This seems to me to be particularly important the further one moves away from the Arab world. The smaller the group and the clearer the motives, the easier it is to overcome the problem.

B) I see how in Germany, in the absence of substantial argumentative skills, any statement that deviates from the mainstream is very quickly and increasingly defamed as "right-wing," and this is also applied to those who vote for the AfD. This political and media failure has significantly promoted voter development. When you put all kinds of ingredients in a pot, everything mixes together into a soup in which you often can no longer identify the original ingredients, and they interact with each other.

When, in a similar failure, statements made at universities or by artists, as well as participation in demonstrations against Israel's policies, are defamed as anti-Semitic—often by the cheerleaders or agitators who claim to see anti-Semitism everywhere in politics, although they only do so for their own benefit—another soup is created: a social climate from which anti-Semitism can actually grow – but which cannot then be substantially controlled because it feeds like a fungus on those who fail.

C) I think that this kind of simplification in problem-solving—which ultimately represents a failure on the part of the elites, who are too cowardly to discuss the failure of the Israeli elites to learn the right lessons from the Holocaust—is a failure to assert the raison d'état, because Israel's security is not possible without the security and humane life of those who exist in its environment.

D) I think that the vast majority of those who are classified as anti-Semites – actually, I should say defamed – have nothing, absolutely nothing, against Jews, but are very much against the policies of the State of Israel towards the Palestinians. The further away you are, the less significant the actions of Israeli settlers – i.e., individual Jews – are likely to be. In my view, it can also be assumed that very few people reject the State of Israel per se, but are solely concerned with current – or at least recent – Israeli policy. Ultimately, this means a considerable reduction in the problem: as far as my logic holds water, there is no need to worry about educating large social groups that hate Jews – certainly to the chagrin of those for whom the eradication of anti-Semitism is a major business model, for which a lot of money is made available, but who inevitably fail and can therefore repeatedly demand that even more money be made available – but can work on themselves in order to change their view of the actions of the State of Israel. In my view, Israel's actions for the benefit of the world ( ) – not least arising from the Holocaust (never again) – would also legitimize it in the eyes of those who fundamentally question Israel's right to exist. The result of such thinking would also be a detoxification of the social climate – with an effect on those who would otherwise feel encouraged to take action against Jews – greater security for Jews, and considerable cost savings in dealing with the problem.

A few remarks on what could be done. Once the situation has been clarified – the actual core of the problem identified – efforts can be made to find solutions (1, 2).

A) Following the example of Albert Schweitzer, Pope Francis, and Rabbi Meir Lau.

B) My view of Israel.

C) My recommendations for resolving the war in Ukraine can certainly also be applied to the conflict in the Middle East. I recommend that the initiative should come from Israel.

D) On being human.

E) Further developing democracy.

Morality – from my perspective, after arriving here: Instead of talking about anti-Semitism, talking about anti-Zionism and drawing the right conclusions from it can be a game changer. I would like to thank you for challenging me: I found the past hour enriching.

My hope that my thoughts would be taken apart did not come true: despite repeated efforts, there has been no response (1, 2) – which brings us to the socially untapped potential of "respect," which we cannot explore further here. A supported reflection on sense and nonsense did not materialize, but a few days of email correspondence and a walk allowed my mental strength to grow sufficiently to think through the issue more deeply.

The following bears witness to this. The discussion led to a whole series of new insights for me, some of which are only reflected in individual sentences that would themselves benefit from deeper consideration, but my effort was to follow an internal logic that did not get too bogged down, one that reveals the nature of the problems and underpins them with essential characteristics that arise from them—in order to make them comprehensible—but all with the goal of working toward a sustainable solution to the problems. This seems to be lacking, and as an example, reference is made to Gaza, the West, and international law by John Neelsen in the NachDenkSeiten of January 6, which describes the development of the conflict with great meticulousness and evidence and concludes: "Neither the existence, nor the right to exist of the State of Israel is at stake, but rather Zionist colonialism, paid for with millions of lives of misery."

Objectively speaking, there is no escaping this conclusion, and it undoubtedly has its place in the spectrum of perspectives – one need only think of South Africa's lawsuit against Israel for genocide before the International Criminal Court, which has already been supported by Bolivia, Turkey, and Malaysia. However, no prospect of outgrowing the problem is offered. Yet this is necessary beyond the immediate conflict. The world urgently needs civilizational progress in order to successfully meet the challenges posed by technological progress to its advantage, and this undoubtedly includes the containment of armed conflicts. The fact that similar facts are used in both cases and similar conclusions are drawn is due to the fact that only a well-founded picture of the situation – the truth – gives rise to justified hope of overcoming the problem.

In clarifying whether my simple understanding that anti-Semitism is when one is against Jews and anti-Zionism is when one is against the State of Israel is sufficient to counter Mr. Königsberg's thesis that anti-Zionists hate Jews – wherever they live – I came across the definitions of the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) from 2005 and the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) from 2016. They cite both threatening and defamatory thoughts and actions against individual and multiple Jews, as well as against the State of Israel and Holocaust denial, as characteristics of anti-Semitism. Of the eleven characteristics listed in the IHRA definition, seven refer to the State of Israel. Anti-Zionism is therefore seen as part of anti-Semitism, and Mr. Königsberg's thesis follows suit. However, there has been considerable criticism of the definitions. In particular, there were complaints about the lack of clarity and precision, as well as the fact that the definition could be used to "suppress criticism of Israel covered by freedom of speech" and "stigmatize unpopular positions on the Middle East conflict." This explains the 2021 Jerusalem Declaration on Anti-Semitism, in which 360 scholars from around the world, referring to the IHRA definition, consider anti-Semitism to be a form of racism, but make a distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in particular.

"One in four Germans—that is, approximately 21 million people—have anti-Semitic views," according to a representative survey of 1,300 participants conducted by the World Jewish Congress in October 2019. In the days that followed, this statement was literally drummed into the German population by virtually all media outlets, and no one questioned it. The first of sixteen statements considered anti-Semitic was: "Jews are just like everyone else." It was shared by 79% of those surveyed. Without hesitation or long reflection, from a humanistic and Christian perspective, I can only answer such a question with "yes." Jews are people like everyone else, and not singling them out is a way of protecting them. The fact that I derive a special responsibility towards Jews from the suffering inflicted upon them is another question – but it also leads me to see a similar responsibility towards Russians and Poles.

I feel similarly about the second and third statements: "Jewish people are more community-oriented than others in Germany" and "Jewish people are more family-oriented than others in Germany." This assumption does not arise from contact with Jews, but from observing Germans, and it is a feeling I also have towards Russians and Poles. This may be wrong, but it is irrelevant in terms of its charged meaning, and it does not contradict the answer to the first statement, because these aspects of socialization are insignificant compared to a general view of humanity. In this respect, it would be – and I assume it is – a shortcoming of the survey if the answer were not followed by the question "why": Why are Jews no different from other people? However, the reverse is also true: I do not understand why these statements should be anti-Semitic.

A little over two years later, there was another study by the World Jewish Congress. According to this study, one-fifth of all adult Germans now hold anti-Semitic views. With approximately 14 million people under the age of 18, that would be approximately 14 million. I searched in vain for reports on the success of the fight against anti-Semitism, which claimed to have reduced the number of anti-Semitic people by 7 million in just over two years. If we now look at the 2022 report by the Federal Association of Research and Information Centers on Anti-Semitism, we see that between 2020 and 2022, an average of 2.400 cases of anti-Semitism were documented annually, a third of which were committed on the internet in 2022. As much as every individual act is punishable by law and must be investigated, is this number in any way comparable to the claim that over 14 million Germans are anti-Semitic?

To be clear: I refuse to accept that 14 or even 21 million people in the Federal Republic of Germany are potentially anti-Semitic. Based on my analysis of the state of German society, I can assume that if a political leadership were to come to power that made hatred of Jews part of its agenda, the population would not be sufficiently resilient to resist it. However, the reasons for this do not lie in a fundamental anti-Semitic attitude, but deeper, and in particular in a silence towards anything that could attract attention because it contradicts the prescribed mainstream thinking – which therefore also creates the conditions for other failures and becomes more entrenched the longer it is maintained. This also means that no one is upset that one in four Germans is anti-Semitic, but there is also reluctance to speak out when Jews are harmed. Countering silence in general is therefore an important contribution to the fight against anti-Semitism – to which I am making a small contribution here.

The validity of this thesis is also evident from the "turning point" of the last two years, marked by Russophobia as state doctrine, which has driven forward the militarization of Germany with a dynamism that was no longer thought possible, without the population being able to counteract it with sufficient force: Although it is clearly directed against their interests – as evidenced by permanently rising energy prices, inflation, recession, the consequences of looming deindustrialization, and the comprehensive threats to the country's security. What was revealed in the NSA affair and continued in the coronavirus pandemic has reached a preliminary climax in the "turning point," with the media as the sixth branch of the armed forces making significant contributions to this. The essential message of these thoughts is the realization that it is not enough to address singular problems without penetrating their inherent nature and solving them within the framework of more complex considerations.

But why is anti-Semitism in Germany—if I may put it this way—carried around like a monstrance and inflated to such an extent that it makes it virtually impossible to combat it and, with it, anti-Zionism in the long term? I believe I have identified two reasons for this.

The core of what is perceived as anti-Semitism in Germany is anti-Zionism, and primarily only insofar as it relates to the policies of today's Israel. Certainly, the closer one is to Israel geographically, the more likely one is to have historical experiences that lead to efforts to deny Israel's right to exist. The Jews were forced to assert themselves in a hostile environment in order to survive. The means to do so did not arise from the realization that the suffering they had endured could only be prevented from recurring through civilizational development, but from the civilizational normality of the time. This included taking land by force of arms, driving out or subjugating the population there, defending what had been achieved and, if possible, expanding. But aggression creates enemies, fuels hatred, and hatred leads to hatred, which the respective elites anchor in their peoples because they do not want to accept the restriction of power and property. Hatred thus unfolds from anti-Zionism, which sees the cause of much of the birth of the State of Israel, to anti-Semitism, which gives the enemy image topicality and concreteness beyond the historical reflection of spatial expansion: if they hadn't come – or gone – we would have our peace.

Examples that fuel this image of the enemy include the settlement policy and the blockade of Gaza, which involve direct experiences with Jews. These policies have long provoked worldwide outrage. Between 2006 and 2023, there were 103 condemnations by the UN Human Rights Council, and since 2015 there have been 125 resolutions against Israel. However, the policy of the West, and Germany in particular, is to place Israeli policy beyond discussion and to make it appear essentially justified. To this end, this lobbyism strives to cover the anti-Zionist attitude with a spreading layer of anti-Semitism, like a layer of fat, in order to nip any discussion of Israeli policy in the bud. Since Hamas' criminal attack on Israel on October 7, this has taken on a similar dimension to the Russophobia that began with the "turning point" on February 24, 2022.

But today's Israeli policy no longer even shies away from sacrificing Israelis to achieve its goals. According to the information available, Hamas' preparations for a major attack were known and allowed to proceed. During the Hamas attack on October 7, Israelis also died at the hands of Israelis, area bombing in Gaza took place without regard for the hostages, and three escaped hostages died even though they were waving white flags. The basis for this action is likely to be the Hannibal Directive, statements by Israeli politicians, and overarching goals such as further land gains, the seizure of Palestinian oil and natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean, and the vision of a Ben-Gurion Canal through the Gaza Strip as an alternative to the Suez Canal.

Another insight concerns the criminal actions of Hamas. From the perspective of the Palestinians and their many sympathizers, Hamas' actions are a liberation struggle to enforce the Palestinians' right to exist as a separate state. From the perspective of the West—and I belong to the West—Hamas uses terrorist means. However, this becomes questionable when one does not shy away from describing Ukraine's commando operations in Russia and Crimea as "guerrilla warfare." In addition, for decades there has been no means by which the Palestinians could legitimize themselves vis-à-vis Israel and the West in order to achieve their right to a self-determined future – for which the West Bank with the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas, which refuses to engage in armed struggle, can serve as an example. In this respect, armed struggle is virtually forced upon the Palestinians.

All of this reflects the tragedy of Israel's development, which I have expressed many times before. The horror of the Holocaust was not used as a step toward civilizational development that would have made Israel a civilizational innovator and the region a model project for the further development of the world. This can no longer be changed, but removing anti-Semitism from anti-Zionism not only points the way to dismantling it, but also creates opportunities to develop Israel's position in the world and thus counter anti-Zionism. This requires a reengineering of Israeli foreign and domestic policy. The current war offers special opportunities for this, precisely because it is so challenging.

As I already mentioned when I revealed the nature of developments in East Germany, it must also be noted here that such an analysis ignores many details that would only interfere with efforts to get to the heart of the problems in order to develop project ideas from there. For example, one could devote an entire article or even a larger treatise to the efforts of the Federal Agency for Civic Education to define anti-Zionist and anti-Israel anti-Semitism. However, these and many other efforts to grasp the problem suffer from the fact that the problem has not been eliminated, let alone contained, for many years—not least, in my opinion, because the debate does not focus on the core of the problems. The typical conclusion, as will be explained below, is the demand for more financial resources, but this has already been tried several times without leading to any reduction in the problems , so that one might actually consider reengineering the problem-solving process in order to make the efforts more effective.

When Salman Rushdie says, "The moment you say that a system of ideas must be feared, whether it is a religious belief system or a secular ideology, the moment you declare a set of ideas immune to criticism, satire, ridicule, or contempt, freedom of thought becomes impossible," this currently reveals the biggest problem in complying with reasons of state toward Israel in a way that is useful to Israel. In large parts of the world, the fact that over 22,000 Palestinians, including over 9,000 children, were killed within two months is branded as genocide – and it may be that the number is much higher, but it is certainly much higher than in the two years of war in Ukraine. In Germany, however, there is almost no media coverage of this, and protests against it are defamed as anti-Semitism. This often interferes with the fundamental right to freedom of expression, weakens the cognitive diversity that is so essential for an innovative country like Germany, and, last but not least, damages the substance of raison d'état. The intimidation of those who cannot ignore the facts leads, as in the pandemic, to social tensions and then to ever greater, increasingly uncontrollable outbursts. The intimidation has become so dogmatic that it does not even stop at people who are considered established. Here are two examples of this before we move on to the second reason for dealing with anti-Semitism.

It is currently impossible to consider this without addressing the recent scandal surrounding Masha Gessen. Even before the Hamas attack on October 7, she had been awarded the 2023 Hannah Arendt Prize for Political Thought by the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, and was due to receive it on December 15. The prize honors individuals "who, in the opinion of an international jury, contribute to public political thought and action in the tradition of political theorist Hannah Arendt." But on December 9, her essay In the Shadow of the Holocaust appeared in THE NEWYORKER, in which she compared the Holocaust to Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip. What happened next is typical of the poisoned thinking in Germany and how that poison subjugates action.

This also applies to the not inconsiderable number of award ceremonies. Wherever one looks, one sees how awards are indoctrinated by narrow political goals and no longer serve to give a voice and lasting value to universally valid values. Examples from last year include the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to an Iranian human rights activist, the Charlemagne Prize to Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, and the Luther Prize "Das unerschrockene Wort" (The Fearless Word) to three Belarusian freedom activists. However, the conflict with Russia has long been a priority above all else—such as supporting Iran policy, a color revolution in Belarus, and the destabilization of China—so it is not surprising that the likelihood of canonization through any awards is significantly increased by being sufficiently Russophobic. The Hannah Arendt Prize is no exception, and the choice of Masha Gessen becomes clear when you look at her English Wikipedia page. Articles for American media on Russian politics and LGBT issues in Russia, a book about the punk band Pussy Riot, her work at Radio Liberty, and criminal proceedings in Russia based on her writings on the war in Ukraine – such as on Bucha – attracted attention. However, the article suddenly changed the way people viewed her.

The spirit of the times increasingly tends to make morality a variable of "value-oriented" thinking, and the more it succeeds in doing so, the more the accepted perspective on a subject is reduced to a single way of describing it—which applies not least to the Holocaust. Intellectuals of all stripes have recognized in light of this development that it is much more lucrative to act as cheerleaders for the zeitgeist than as spirits who question the stability of a view through critical thinking in order to contribute to its substance. Recent award ceremonies show that no one can be sure of avoiding bashing if they do not conform to the narrative – at a frequency that I can regard as a step forward, given my experience as a long-standing member of Werkstatt Deutschland, that in 2011 — ten years after his acclaimed speech in the German Bundestag — President Putin was not awarded the Quadriga. Don't stand out was the motto of organizers of literary award ceremonies on several occasions in recent months, in a spirit of anticipatory obedience: This is evidenced by the cancellation of the LiBeraturpreis award ceremony for Israeli writer Adania Shibly on October 20 at the Frankfurt Book Fair and the Peter Weiss Prize of the City of Bochum for German writer Sharon Dodua Otoo. Meanwhile, there seems to be a competition between those who stir up sentiment with their rituals of outrage and those who then grovel: Who is faster?

This fate also befell Masha Gessen. Following the article in THE NEWYORKER and criticism from the German-Israeli Society, the Heinrich Böll Foundations in Bremen and Berlin, which were jointly responsible for the award ceremony, and the Bremen Senate withdrew their support. However, the sponsoring association stood by its decision and held the award ceremony on a smaller scale: "We find it remarkable that the public debate about understanding, assessing, and condemning Hamas' terrorist attacks on Israel and Israel's bombing of Gaza is being blocked by the boycott of a political thinker who is striving to bring knowledge, insight, and sharp thinking to this debate."

This intellectual capacity becomes clear when one considers not only the aforementioned article, but also the acceptance speech at the award ceremony and the panel discussion that the Heinrich Böll Foundation decided to hold after some reflection. One inevitably comes to the question of whether the examination of Israel's actions in Gaza has revealed Masha Gessen's analytical self and whether she previously only served the desired zeitgeist, because the analysis that comes to bear is actually also suitable for penetrating the nature of the war in Ukraine. Her reflections on the Holocaust deserve attention because they encourage reflection on it and give it significance for the preservation of human values for all times, past and future: As a norm for the possible dehumanization of civilization, against which other earlier or later events with similar characteristics can be measured – be it the extermination of the Native Americans, the genocide of the Hereros and Namas, and currently of the Palestinians, but also Ukraine's planned "detoxification" of Crimea. Even the Roman philosopher Seneca (c. 4 BC - 65 AD) knew that "greatness has no fixed measure; only comparison elevates or diminishes it." It is to Masha Gessen's credit that she makes it possible to draw on the Holocaust for comparison. In doing so, she contributes to civilizational culture – "Every era has its own challenges. You have to recognize them and you have to face them." – and for cutting off any development that could lead to a Holocaust that can be compared to its other characteristics: "Something always precedes what follows."

The extent to which the guardians of opinion ensure that ranks remain closed and that any deviation immediately leads to exclusion was also evident in the case of Greta Thunberg. When the icon of the Fridays for Future movement commented on the suffering in the Gaza Strip in guest articles for The Guardian and Aftonbladet, accusing Israel of genocide and warning that there could be no climate justice without human rights, a veritable shitstorm of criticism poured down on her from the mainstream media. One example is an interview with French historian Pierre Rosanvallon in Die Welt on December 19. As a cheerleader for the narrative, he took a twisted view of anti-Semitism, accused Greta Thunberg of lacking historical knowledge, and concluded that she was not qualified to comment on the matter in any meaningful way—all while casually accusing the younger generation in general of allowing themselves to be manipulated by images.

The subtlety of this approach is evident in the fact that Greta Thunberg's view of the conflict is not analyzed in depth, but rather the mere fact that she attended demonstrations calling for a free Palestine "from the river to the sea" is singled out as evidence: The reader learns nothing about the one-sided interpretation of the symbol, and this is not reinforced by the fact that the Federal Ministry of the Interior has adopted it by banning the symbol. Saxony-Anhalt can also be accused of narrow-mindedness when it summarily makes a commitment to Israel's right to exist a prerequisite for naturalization and Justice Minister Marco Buschmann declares his support for this. Just imagine if someone chosen to promote this innovation of small-mindedness later commits an attack: no wonder you are left behind when you come up with ideas that have a deeper systemic impact.

Let us turn to the second reason why anti-Semitism is so charged in Germany. On May 12, 2021, the federal government adopted a plan to combat right-wing extremism and racism. One billion euros was allocated for this purpose for the period from 2021 to 2024. This was followed on November 30, 2022, by a National Strategy against Anti-Semitism and for Jewish Life – for which I could not find how much funding was made available. On December 14, 2022, a Democracy Promotion Act was added, which will cost 212 million euros per year. On November 16, 2023, another 110 million euros followed. There are also plans for a Future Center for German Unity and European Transformation with an estimated cost of 200 million euros. There are additional funding pools at the federal and state levels.

What drives me to make this list—given the fact that we are seeing anti-Semitism spreading, right-wing extremism spreading, racism spreading, and democracy increasingly under threat? My thesis is that we are dealing with a billion-dollar business in which anti-Semitism, right-wing extremism, racism, and the threat to democracy in general serve only as marketing shells for the intention to enrich oneself with public funds. To make matters worse, there is no interest in achieving significant success in curbing these issues, because that would stand in the way of obtaining more funds in the next funding period. In line with The Emperor's New Clothes, I firmly believe that the credo of those who benefit from these funds is: the more anti-Semites, right-wing extremists, racists, and enemies of democracy, the better.

This is facilitated by a rather apathetic, unreflective attitude among the German population, which is reinforced by the general effort to promote monocultural stupidity and tittytainment. However, counteracting this basic attitude by strengthening cognitive diversity and the intrinsic value of society in general is obviously not the purpose and certainly not the result of the projects funded by the resources provided, and so society's resilience to any influences suffers. Therefore, other approaches are needed to overcome the problems, and these include a discussion of Israel's policies: fundamentally underpinned by objectivity and geared toward the goal of serving the interests of the state. Doing so not only gives hope for contributions to a sustainable guarantee of Israel's security, but also brings the interests of the state into line with international law.

Morality

When, after whatever form the end of Israel's operation in the Gaza Strip may take, the actual number of dead and injured is determined, when statements by the UN about the uninhabitability of the Gaza Strip are spread to every corner of the world via countless photos, and when Israel and its Western partners believe they can continue to dictate how the Palestinians should be treated, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism will reach new heights. Zionism will thus become a driver of anti-Semitism and a delegitimizing factor from which to derive a claim to the Holocaust, because the impact of the current operation in the Gaza Strip, taking into account global developments and the world's awareness, dwarfs the impact of all previous conflicts between the Palestinians and the Israelis in recent decades. The general public may not yet understand the nature of the war between the US and Russia, partly due to the massive use of the media as a sixth branch of the armed forces: there is no escaping the truth in the Gaza Strip, and its impact is reinforced by the West's different treatment of Russia and Israel. Actions in the Middle East are thus becoming a beacon that will weaken Israel and the West in the long term, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy and economically. If we do not want this to happen – or at least want to mitigate the consequences – Israel and the West need to reflect as quickly as possible on a sustainable end to the conflict, and so the concluding thoughts are intended to contribute to this effort.

What use is an analysis if it does not lead to ideas for addressing the problems identified? In the present case, these problems exist in a complex space of interdependent global, intergovernmental, domestic, cultural, and ideological thinking and action, in which efforts to address individual aspects of the problem fail due to their interdependencies. What is needed is #modernThinking, which in this case requires a fundamental and comprehensive rethinking in order to achieve lasting peace and development in the Middle East – something that can only succeed if we think beyond regional boundaries. Call it a plan, call it a scenario: the following considerations are intended to serve this purpose.

Fundamental orientations

Albert Schweitzer provides a civilizational orientation: "I am life that wants to live, in the midst of life that wants to live." Pope Francis provides a procedural orientation: "I see very clearly that what the Church needs today is the ability to heal wounds and warm people's hearts – closeness and connectedness. I see the Church like a field hospital after a battle. You don't ask a seriously wounded person about their cholesterol or high blood sugar. You have to heal the wounds. Then we can talk about everything else. Heal the wounds, heal the wounds... You have to start at the very bottom." A solution to the problem must be face-saving for all sides and enforceable in domestic politics. It must be of such short-, medium-, and long-term benefit that it curtails any interest on the part of all parties involved in maintaining the conflict. In Germany, the question of what constitutes anti-Semitism and what constitutes anti-Zionism needs to be reassessed.

The goal is a two-state solution and mutual recognition of the right of Palestine and Israel to exist. But on what territory should the two states exist? Israel has expanded in terms of territory in recent decades and created further facts on the ground through settlement – which is considered contrary to international law by several UN resolutions. However, it must be taken into account that Israeli society has become radicalized to a not inconsiderable degree. This makes it difficult to return territories. On the other hand, there are the Palestinians in the non-contiguous autonomous territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The latter covers only about 40% of the area covered by the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The remaining area – the so-called "C areas" – was originally supposed to be converted into autonomous areas within five years, but this never happened. They cover 6,020 square kilometers, while the C areas should be about 8,500 square kilometers in size. This is significant in that of the more than five million Palestinians, two million alone live in the 365 sq km Gaza Strip, and there are predictions that the population could rise to 10 million by 2050. However, more than 300,000 Israelis now also live in the C areas. Joint efforts to "tailor" Palestine must therefore primarily take three aspects into account in order to enable success and make it sustainable: the political situation in Israel, the demographic development of the Palestinians, and the connection between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

There must be no doubt about the right of Israel or Palestine to exist, and mutual recognition is necessary. Israel must recognize that it cannot guarantee its security if it does not recognize the Palestinians' right to their own state and fulfill the Palestinians' hope for a self-determined life. Plans such as the exploitation of Palestinian mineral resources and a Ben Gurion Canal must be abandoned. The Palestinians must realize that they will never live in a state of Palestine if they question Israel's right to a state of its own. The development that is necessary is similar to that between France and Germany after the Second World War, to which the Schuman Declaration of 1950 contributed.

Regional peace is not possible unless it includes Lebanon and Syria. For the region's foreseeable prosperity once the problem is solved, it is important not to forget the development of Libya and Yemen. The goal must be "flourishing landscapes."

Stage 1

Germany declares its willingness to launch a diplomatic initiative along the lines of raison d'état to achieve the two-state solution. It asks France, Poland, and Spain to participate as partners. The Central Council of Jews in Germany declares its willingness to support the initiative: it agrees to reassess anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Germany and to take into account that its responsibility for Jews also extends to assessing the usefulness of Israeli policy for Jews.

Israel takes up the German initiative. Similar to what I had suggested before Russia's invasion of Ukraine – during his visit to Moscow, Chancellor Scholz had the opportunity to take up an initiative by President Putin at the press conference that would have prevented the war in Ukraine – the film "The Attack" starring Ben Affleck can serve as a template. Israel suspends its military operations in the Gaza Strip, withdraws another part of its troops – which will please the economy – and allows comprehensive aid deliveries. Hamas agrees to refrain from any attacks on Israel for the duration of the negotiations and refrains from abusing the ceasefire to arm itself with weapons and ammunition supplied by external sources. Another group of hostages is released without compensation.

Stage 2

Hamas and the Palestinian Authority clarify their representative authority. Key topics of negotiation are the border between the two states – including Jerusalem, for which Berlin can serve as an example, albeit without physical borders – ensuring their security, and establishing a special economic zone for Palestine. Palestine's security should not be guaranteed by its own army, but by declarations from relevant partners to vouch for its security. Iran is holding back on this, but Israel should make declarations by which it can be measured in the future. In return, a special economic zone will be established for 25 or 50 years to undo decades of obstruction to development. This could also mean economic prosperity for Israel. Israel is withdrawing its efforts to access Palestinian mineral resources.

Israel's security cannot be guaranteed without offering the Palestinian population attractive development prospects and a self-determined life – for which good education and jobs are necessary. The nations of the world are called upon to make a stimulus payment to ensure food and health care for the population, to begin rebuilding the Gaza Strip, and to initiate initial investments. In addition, they should make annual payments for a period of 25 or 50 years to a sovereign wealth fund to be established, from which short-, medium- and long-term payments will be made to the Palestinian population and opportunities for infrastructure development will be created, with the amount of the payments being redefined every five years. The fund is modeled on the Norwegian pension fund. Initially, it will be used to finance monthly payments in the form of social assistance, general education, scholarships, etc., and later pensions and investments. The US, Israel, and the Arab states have a special responsibility in this regard.

The US and Turkey withdraw their troops from Syria and allow Syria sovereignty over its entire territory. President Erdogan and President Assad meet for the long-planned meeting. Syria declares amnesty for all citizens until the deadline for the withdrawal of all troops illegally stationed in the country and guarantees equal rights for all its citizens. After the deadline, Syria secures its sovereignty with the partners it accepts. It recognizes the state of Israel—as do Lebanon and Yemen—and ensures that no citizens of its country are active in any way against Turkey.

In Germany, efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict have sparked a public debate about the nature of German society, the essence of democracy in the 21st century, individual self-determination, and social goals for the coming years and decades. Programs to combat anti-Semitism, right-wing extremism, and racism, as well as to protect democracy, are being evaluated.

Stage 3

After successful negotiations and the creation of the necessary framework conditions, Israel declares an end to the war and withdraws its troops completely. The State of Palestine is proclaimed. Elections produce legitimate representatives. Both states recognize each other. The states accepted by both sides declare their commitment to the security of Palestine. Israel grants amnesty to all Palestinians.

South Africa withdraws its complaint before the International Criminal Court.

Sponsor regions support the development of agricultural, production, and scientific infrastructure, as well as housing construction.

Iran recognizes the State of Israel. Other states in the Middle East follow suit. The US and the European Union end their sanctions against Iran and Syria; the American ambassador returns to Tehran. In a similar – albeit layered – manner, development in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Libya is made possible.

Having reached the end of this reflection, I can, like Masha Gessen, who was aware of what she might trigger when she wrote about the Holocaust, express a similar clarity about the possible interpretations of my words, and so it is necessary to focus on two questions – to which I refuse to give my own answers: Was my initial thesis defensible in terms of content, and am I now a "modern anti-Semite"? The latter would be serious because I see myself as striving to make a contribution to the long-term validity of reasons of state and, despite considerable effort, I do not recognize any substantive or logical deficiencies in my observations. However, third parties could, from an objective—and I emphasize objective—point of view, well find signs that I have not yet noticed intellectually. I consider the freedom to be prepared to discuss such a sensitive topic in such depth and to question oneself in this way, thereby increasing the likelihood of failure, to be essential in order to be able to approach the nature of the problems and, in general, to turn social discussions into a healthy discourse with which the challenges of the times can be successfully met. If one is then certified as having failed in any way, one can only be grateful for it, and so I am certainly looking forward to the response—which I hope will not be expressed only in silence.

The strength to focus on the thoughts presented here and to penetrate the original post in an even more differentiated way arose from a quality of dealing with me in another matter that is not part of my permanent experience. I would like to express my gratitude for this.

Antisemitismus.pdf

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